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Wikipedia |
This month in 1995, Barings Bank, founded in 1762, in operation for more than two centuries, a bank where the Queen of England maintained an account, formally folded. It's demise could be traced to massive trading losses somewhere in the amount of £800M. By late February 1995 it had become known that Barings was on the wrong side of an enormous bet on Nikkei Futures. Without getting too technical about it, the position would make money if the Japanese stock market went up, and lose money if the reverse happened. If the market went down by a lot, then the position, or more accurately its owner Barings, stood to lose a lot. Unfortunately, this period also corresponded with the Great Kobe Earthquake of 1995, and in the weeks that followed the earthquake, the Japanese stock market, while volatile, fell much more than it rose. Nearing the end of February, the Barings position was showing a loss of around $500M, an amount which, to put in the proper perspective, was at that time more than half the Bank's capital. The possibility of insolvency had become real, and the bank could no longer afford to hold on to the position and hope that the market turned, because if it did, and the market dropped just a little more, then all its capital would be wiped out. The fact that Barings position had become publicized also created a separate but very real problem. When people know you HAVE to sell, than all the more, they will not buy from you except at distressed prices, this is especially true in the predatory world of money in which the trading pits of futures exchanges exist. True enough, with no one willing to take their losing positions off their hands except at fire-sale prices, by the time the smoke cleared, Barings had lost around $1B and had gone over the brink into the abyss of insolvency. It formally ceased to exist in March of 1995.
Barings top management claimed that all the losses were caused by unauthorized trading carried out by a single rouge trader, Nick Leeson, and that he had misled his superiors through fraud and deception. I am inclined to believe them, because unlike other instances wherein losses were attributed to "rogue trader/s", a review of Leeson's activities reveals that his actions, from the start, never benefited the bank, and so it is difficult to imagine that the bank would continuously sanction the activities if they knew about these.
By all accounts, including his very own, Leeson's trading never showed a profit overall and never benefited his
employer, and so it is quite easy to believe they never sanctioned his
activities. Additionally, it is even more unbelievable that Barings management would sanction any single risky activity that had the potential to endanger the firm's entire capital base, which Lesson's trading activities definitely were, and indeed eventually did. No bank does that. Truth be told, the most successful of banks do not even really trade on opinions and outlooks, but more on asymmetric trades wherein they have a large advantage - whether it be an edge in information, or speed in execution, or maybe capital, or perhaps all of the above. But that it is an entirely different subject to be saved for another day. Suffice it to say that I believe no bank would risk its entire capital on a trading position just because Nick Leeson has a gut feeling that the Japanese market is going to appreciate.
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Yasuo Hamanaka theatlantic.com |
Contrast this with the case of Yasuo Hamanaka, a trader for Japanese trading giant Sumitomo Corporation. For years, Hamanaka had effectively cornered the copper market and kept prices high by buying up large quantities of copper futures. His actions in the copper futures markets were no big secret, and in the trading pits where he operated, he was referred to as Mr. 5%, because at any point in time, he usually controlled around 5% of the open contracts on copper futures. While 5% may not sound like much, it is a position that takes an enormous amount of cash to support and is enough to affect the price of copper. No single party usually owns close to that percentage of open contracts, and in providing this additional demand - artificial demand is probably not too harsh a phrase - Hamanaka succeded in driving copper prices higher than they would normally be, and this benefited Sumitomo immensely in the form of increased profits on the physical copper that it sold. The only problem with the scheme was that it was one of those arrangements that worked until it didn't. When you succeed in driving the price of a physical commodity higher, you are also effectively encouraging producers to produce more, and this added production drives prices lower, and when you're the single biggest buyer in a market where the natural forces of supply and demand are driving prices lower, your losses could get very large, very quickly. Hamanaka's losses eventually reached almost $3B before he was shut down, and when his employer, Sumitomo, tried to take the "rogue trader" excuse, it strained credulity because Hamanaka's activities had greatly benefited the company for so long.
When Leeson's superiors at Barings claimed that his trading was "unauthorized" it is much easier to believe them, because it is simply too difficult to imagine that they would have gone along with it given how much risk it meant for the firm. With all this being said however, in claiming that they were unaware of Leeson's activites, Barings management, unfortunately for them, also necessarily admitted to another sort of mea culpa, far less evil but perhaps even more embarrassing - that of impressive ineptitude. In the first place, what does it say about the Bank's control functions that a single employee could hide that enormous a paper loss (a very real obligation for the bank) for months? For Leeson's superiors not to fully understand his activities is perhaps excusable, because after all, hospital management need not know exactly how a brain surgeon does what does he does, and neither does airline management need to know exactly how to fly a plane. But it is a clear failure when management does not know what is a real liability and how out-sized theirs had grown.
Furthermore, day after day, Barings provided Leeson with the margins (think of this as capital) required to support his losing positions, positions he was not supposed to have, and it was particularly damning that the capital it was providing were in amounts that were totally unjustified by the volume of legitimate business Leeson was doing for the firm. The situation is somewhat analogous to a family wherein a teenage son is caught smoking. The parents claimed to know nothing of the son's smoking, but admitted to lending the son their lighter, day after day, for close to a year. What did they think the son was doing with the lighter? According to him, they said, he was barbecuing, and they assumed he was being truthful, even if they never saw any signs of the grill ever being used, and neither ever smelled nor ever saw barbecued meat. So in the end, while they would probably be absolved of any accusations that they ordered their son to smoke, by the very statements they made to absolve themselves, they also revealed an astounding lack of parental competence and even common sense.
Strange as it may seem that upper management of a supposedly "venerable" company could so thoroughly be in the dark about what one particular employee was doing, I believe it is actually not too uncommon, especially in very old companies. I have come to believe, and I generalize loosely here, that in many organizations, save for those with sustained extraordinary leadership, sooner or later, pettiness overcomes talent - that is, when pettiness is pitted against talent for survival inside the organization, pettiness will usually win out, because the petty spend more time and work harder at politicking and intra-office warfare.
Whether it be in governments or commercial companies, as years pass, the petty come to dominate, or at least outnumber, the talented. As the world changes, new technologies come into being and new businesses activities come to be, and unfortunately, the petty will never admit that they cannot see the emperor's new clothes. Difficult as it may be to imagine, it is entirely possible that situations evolve wherein broad swaths of a firm's workforce no longer fully understand the firm's business, and when that happens they will work even harder to preserve their position within it. While I know little about Barings Bank's exact circumstances, my point is that I do not find it difficult to imagine a company wherein a significant number of employees, even those in upper management, especially in fact, those in upper management, do not truly understand the nuances of new businesses that the company may take on. So it is not unexpected at all that situations may develop wherein they hand that teenage boy the lighter day after day without even understanding the implications.